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EQUILIBRIUM COORDINATION WITH DISCRETIONARY
POLICYMAKING
Richard Dennis, Tatiana Kirsanova
June 14, 2016
Abstract
Discretionary policymakers cannot manage private-sector expectations and cannot coor-
dinate the actions of future policymakers. As a consequence, coordination failures can occur
and multiple equilibria can arise. In this paper we employ notions of self-enforceability and
learnability to motivate and identify equilibria of particular interest in discretionary policy
problems exhibiting multiple equilibria. Central among these criteria are whether an equilib-
rium is robust to the formation of coalitions, and whether it is learnable by private agents
and jointly learnable by private agents and the policymaker. Unless the Pareto-preferred
equilibrium is learnable by private agents we nd little reason to expect coordination on that
equilibrium.
Key Words: Discretionary policymaking, multiple equilibria, coordination, equilibrium selec-
tion.
JEL References: E52, E61, C62, C73
Discretionary policymakers can fall foul of expectations traps and coordination failures. When
private agents are forward-looking their expectations, shaped by anticipations about future policy,
inuence how policy today is conducted. The discretionary policymakers Achilles heel is that
when formulating policy it is unable to manage private sector expectations, and this inability
leads to policies that are sub-optimal exhibiting ination and/or stabilisation bias and leaves
ajar the door to multiple equilibria. When expectations cannot be managed, private agents
can form expectations that, although unwelcome from the policymakers perspective, lead private
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agents to react in a manner that traps the policymaker into implementing a policy that validates
those expectations. The trap is closed when a policy that renders those unwelcome expectations
without foundation is more costly and hence less attractive to the discretionary policymaker than
a policy that accommodates them.
It is not unusual for economies to transition between periods of high and low ination or high
and low economic volatility, a phenomenon that expectations traps have the potential to explain
(Albanesi et al., 2003). Similarly, transitions from one equilibrium to another o¤ers an explana-
tion for policy regime changes, like those analysed by Davig and Leeper (2006). Accordingly, one
explanation for the change in U.S. inations behavior between the 1970s and the 1980s could be
that Volckers appointment to Federal Reserve Chairman served to coordinate expectations and
behavior, switching the economy from one discretionary equilibrium to another. However, in
order to utilise the explanatory power of multiple equilibria it is necessary to rst consider how
an economy arrives at a particular equilibrium. In the words of Benhabib and Farmer (1999,
pp. 438) in any model with multiple equilibria one must address the issue of how an equilibrium
comes about.
We study a model in which monetary policy is conducted under discretion and for which there
are multiple equilibria; these equilibria are nite in number, distinct, and can be welfare ranked.
In this context we consider the issue of how the agents residing in the model might coordinate
on an equilibrium. We suggest two approaches. First, following Oudiz and Sachs (1985) we
note that feedback equilibria of the discretionary control problem correspond to Markov-perfect
Nash equilibria of a corresponding dynamic game. Although unilateral deviations from a Nash
equilibrium are not benecial, any particular Nash equilibrium may not be meaningful in the
sense that it is not robust to the formation of coalitions that deviate jointly from equilibrium
play. Pursuing this idea, we examine whether the Nash equilibria that we obtain are robust to
coalition-formation, drawing on the notion of self-enforceability (Bernheim, Peleg, and Whinston,
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1987). Specically, we ask whether Pareto-dominated equilibria survive coalition-formation or
instead whether a coalition may form to achieve a switch to the Pareto-preferred equilibrium.
In our model, once coordination on the Pareto-preferred equilibrium occurs no coalition will
choose to deviate. Informal justication for coalition-formation as an equilibrium selection
mechanism comes from the fact that monetary policy is invariably conducted by committees
whose members have tenures that are over-lapping and span multiple decision periods, providing
ample opportunity for (costless) discussions of strategy and for the formation of non-binding
coalitions.
Second, we consider learning as a coordinating mechanism for equilibrium selection (Evans,
1986), drawing on the large literature that employs learning to analyse coordination in rational
expectations models (see Guesnerie and Woodford (1992), Evans and Guesnerie (1993; 2005), and
Evans and Honkapohja (2001), among others). We extend the learning literature by developing
iterative E-stability conditions in discretionary policy problems involving multiple agents that
determine whether private agents and/or the policymaker might reasonably learn and coordinate
on a particular equilibrium. Moreover, we prove that iterative E-stability and coalition formation
are related. A su¢ ciently large coalition of policymakers should be able to generate the switch
in private sector expectations needed to coordinate on the Pareto-preferred equilibria, provided
the Pareto-optimal equilibrium is iteratively E-stable under private-sector learning.
We discuss these coordination mechanisms using a sticky price model with government debt
adapted from Leeper (1991) by Blake and Kirsanova (2012) that in known to exhibit multiple
discretionary equilibria. In this model the task confronting the central bank is to stabilise ination
without impacting unduly the real economy. Ination is determined by the expected path of
real marginal costs, so the policy challenge is to generate an appropriate path for real marginal
costs. Because ination depends on the entire expected path for real marginal costs while
the discretionary policymaker can choose only todays policy, the policy chosen today depends
3
necessarily on expected future policy. At the same time, the decisions that future policymakers
make depend materially on the economic circumstances that they nd themselves in, and hence
on the choices that previous policymakers have made. This interaction between policymakers
over time can lead to multiple equilibria.
The discretionary equilibria that we examine are all examples of sustainable equilibria. In
this sense our research is related to the work on sustainable plans initiated by Chari and Kehoe
(1990). Like ourselves Chari and Kehoe (1990) consider the design of optimal policy in the
absence of commitment. However we examine policies that are Markovian and focus on the
equilibrium selection issue whereas they examine the set of equilibria that can be supported by
trigger strategies.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 1 we describe the simple
New Keynesian model with government debt. In Section 2 we formulate the discretionary policy
problem and describe the properties of the resulting equilibria. In Section 3 we use the model to
motivate and describe mechanisms by which agents might coordinate on an equilibrium. Section 4
concludes. We leave the formal treatment of the coordination mechanisms in the linear-quadratic
class of models to Appendices.
1 A simple New Keynesian model
To illustrate the equilibrium coordination process, we study a simple New Keynesian model with
government debt that is based on Leeper (1991). This model was used previously by Blake and
Kirsanova (2012) to establish the existence of multiple discretionary equilibria in linear-quadratic
models. The economy is populated by a representative household, by a unit-continuum of
monopolistically competitive rms, and by a single large government that performs separately
monetary policy and scal policy. Fiscal policy is undertaken via a mechanistic rule that relates
the income tax rate to the debt-to-output ratio. Monetary policy, in contrast, is conducted under
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discretion with the central bank choosing the nominal rate on a one-period non-state-contingent
nominal bond. Importantly, when formulating monetary policy the central bank takes the
scal policy rule into account. Monopolistically competitive rms produce di¤erentiated goods
according to a production function that depends only on labor, and these goods are combined via
a Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) technology to produce an aggregate output good that is allocated to
either private consumption or government spending. Households choose their consumption and
leisure and can transfer income over time through purchasing government bonds. The government
issues bonds period-by-period in order to pay the principal and interest on its existing debt and
to fund any primary budget decit. Firms set prices subject to a Calvo (1983) nominal price
rigidity, and aggregation across prices leads to a New Keynesian Phillips curve relating ination
to expected future ination, to real marginal costs, and to a serially correlated markup shock.
When approximated about an e¢ cient zero-ination non-stochastic steady state, the Phillips
curve can be expressed as1
bt+1 = bt   ct; (1)
t = Ett+1 + ct + bt + ut; (2)
where bt represents the ratio of real government debt to output, ct represents real consumption,
t represents ination, and ut represents the markup shock. In equations (1) and (2),  2
(0; 1) denotes the discount factor, while  2 (0; 1),  2 (0;  1),  2 (0;1), and  2 (0;1)
are convolutions of behavioral parameters preference and technology parameters. Underlying
equations (1) and (2) is a scal policy rule that relates the income-tax rate positively to the
economys debt-to-output ratio.
Following (Clarida et al., 1999), we assume that the central banks policy instrument is con-
sumption, ct. The central banks intertemporal welfare criterion is described by the quadratic
1The models complete derivation and rst-order approximation can be found in Blake and Kirsanova (2012).
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loss function
Lt = Et
1X
s=t
s t
 
2s + c
2
s

; (3)
where  2 (0;1) is a convolution of behavioral parameters, derived under the assumption that
the monopolistic distortion is o¤set by a labor subsidy, nanced by a lump-sum tax.
Currie and Levine (1985a) and Backus and Dri¢ ll (1986) show certainty equivalence for this
class of models. As a consequence, we focus on the deterministic component of the model in
what follows, setting the markup shock aside.
2 Coordination failures and multiple discretionary equilibria
When formulating the optimal monetary policy, the central bank takes into account the evolution
of the aggregate economy, equations (1) and (2). The current-period policymaker determines
their policy, knowing that all future policymakers will solve an equivalent decision problem.
Consider the period-t optimisation problem. Because bt is the only state variable and the model
is linear-quadratic, in a Markov-perfect equilibrium expectations of t+1 can depend only on bt+1,
and the dependence must be linear
Ett+1 = bbt+1: (4)
With a quadratic policy objective, the cost-to-go from t+ 1 is V b2t+1, where V is a non-negative
scalar. Accordingly, the period-t central banks problem is to choose ct to minimise
2t + c
2
t + V b
2
t+1;
subject to equations (1), (2), and (4). Combining the three constraints yields
t = (b + ) bt + (  b) ct;
6
which allows the optimal discretionary policy problem to be expressed in terms of the Bellman
equation
V b2t = minct
n
[(b + ) bt + (  b) ct]2 + c2t + V b2t+1
o
: (5)
Optimising equation (5) yields a solution of the form
ct = cbbt;
t = bbt;
bt+1 = bbbt;
Lt = V b
2
t ;
where
cb =  (  b) (b + )  V
2V + (  b)2 + 
; (6)
b = b +  + (  b) cb; (7)
bb =   cb; (8)
V = [(b + ) + (  b) cb]2 + V (  cb)2 + c2b : (9)
Employing the Fisher equation, the form of this solution can be used to determine the coe¢ cient
on debt in the equilibrium reaction function for the nominal interest rate
it = ibbt: (10)
For this decision problem, any set of coe¢ cients fcb; b; V g that satisfy equations (6), (7), and
(9) represents a discretionary equilibrium (with bb and ib determined residually by equations (8)
and (10)). As discussed in Blake and Kirsanova (2012) this model possesses three discretionary
equilibria, which we label A, B, and C in what follows. Some characteristics of these three
equilibria are reported in Table 1.2
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Table 1
Three Discretionary Equilibria
Policy Private sector Implied response Speed of Value
Eqm. Reaction Reaction of interest rate adjustment function
cb b ib bb V
A  0:0343 0:0066 0:0103 0:9408 0:0004
B 0:0155 0:0430 0:0380 0:9314 0:0131
C 1:6403 0:2561  1:0748 0:6237 0:1449
Table 1 shows that equilibria A and B share certain characteristics while equilibrium C
appears very di¤erent. In particular, the feedback coe¢ cients on consumption, ination, and the
nominal interest rate in equilibrium C are all much larger in magnitude than those for equilibria
A and B, suggesting greater volatility in a stochastic economy. In addition, where the nominal
interest rate is raised in response to higher debt in equilibria A and B it is lowered markedly in
equilibrium C. These three equilibria produce qualitatively and quantitatively di¤erent economic
dynamics, as shown in Figure 1 which plots the responses of key variables to an initial debt-level
that is one percent higher than steady state.
Looking at Figure 1 and focusing rst on equilibrium A (Panel A), if initial debt is higher
than its steady state value, then the scal authority raises the tax rate according to its scal rule
which relates the tax rate positively to the stock of debt. Higher tax revenues lead to a slow
reduction in debt while the resulting cost-push ination is addressed through monetary policy.
The nominal interest rate is raised slightly, which lowers consumption and tax revenues, but this
2The parameterisation follows Blake and Kirsanova (2012). The models frequency is quarterly. The subjective
discount factor  is set to 0:99,  is set to 0:9343,  is set to 0:1894,  is set to 0:0582,  is set to 0:0025, and  is
set to 0:0087. Underlying this parameterisation is a scal policy rule for the tax rate that has a coe¢ cient on the
debt-to-output ratio of 0:075.
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reduction in tax revenues only slows slightly the rate at which government debt declines. In
subsequent periods, although the nominal interest rate is lowered gradually back to steady state,
debt is brought back to steady state predominantly through scal surpluses, rather than through
a decline in the cost debt-nancing. In equilibrium B (Panel B), the nominal interest rate is
raised by more than it is in equilibrium A. This di¤erence arises because ination is perceived to
be higher in the future, which leads to an ongoing negative real interest rate. A consequence of
this persistently negative real interest rate is that consumption rises slightly, which is consistent
with higher marginal costs and higher ination, while the increased tax revenues contribute to
debt-stabilisation, which occurs more rapidly than in equilibrium A.
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Fig. 1. Transition to steady state from a high-debt initial state
As suggested by Table 1, where ination, consumption, debt, and the nominal interest rate
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behave similarly in equilibria A and B, their behavior in equilibrium C (Panel C) is very di¤erent.
In particular, the central bank responds to the higher debt level by stimulating consumption and
output, which raises real marginal costs and causes ination to rise by more than it otherwise
would. Such monetary policy causes tax revenues to rise, which leads to a rapid decline in
government debt. In this equilibrium, in order to stabilise debt the central bank lowers the cost
of nancing the debt, which causes consumption, output, and real marginal costs to rise and
places upward pressure on ination. With the real interest rate decreasing in response to higher
initial debt, in the spirit of Leeper (1991) monetary policy can be thought of as being passive in
equilibria B and C and active in equilibrium A (where the real interest rate rises).
Importantly, Table 1 shows that the three equilibria can be welfare ranked and that equilibrium
A is the Pareto-preferred equilibrium. Ideally, then, although this model admits three distinct
Markov-perfect equilibria, the most desirable equilibrium, the equilibrium that all agents residing
in the model would like to prevail, is equilibrium A. To understand better why multiple equilibria
arise in this model, it is useful to recognise that the challenge facing the central bank is to return
the economy to steady state without creating too large of a recession. According to the Phillips
curve, in any stationary equilibrium ination depends on the entire expected future path of real
marginal costs,
t = Et
1X
j=t
(j t) (mcj + uj) ;
where real marginal costs are given by
mct = ct + bt:
Notice that when the discount factor, , is large mct and mct+1 are highly substitutable in
terms of their e¤ect on period-t ination. Clearly, if ination is above target, then there are
multiple paths for real marginal costs that will return ination to target. Each of these paths for
real marginal costs is associated with a di¤erent monetary policy and each has a di¤erent cost in
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terms of loss. Faced with debt higher than steady state, the central bank might choose a policy
that involves higher real marginal costs (consumption) and ination if that policy stimulates tax
revenues and future central banks are expected to raise the nominal interest rate in response to
declining debt.
3 Equilibrium coordination
In the previous section we studied the three equilibria possessed by the simple model with debt
and emphasised that they can be welfare ranked. Of these three equilibria, equilibrium C, in
particular, exhibits many undesirable properties, such as the prescription that monetary policy
should be kept very loose when debt levels are high in order to reduce debt by lowering the govern-
ments borrowing costs. In this section we consider two mechanisms through which coordination
on a particular equilibrium might occur: coalition forming and learnability.
3.1 Coalition forming
We rst approach the coordination problem by asking whether an equilibrium is self-enforceable
(Bernheim et al., 1987; Bernheim and Whinston, 1987), robust to the potential formation of coali-
tions containing consecutive policymakers. The central idea is that in non-cooperative decision
problems in which policymakers can communicate strategy and make non-binding commitments
a meaningful Nash equilibria should be coalition-proof. Intuitively, policymakers can more
easily coordinate on an equilibrium if no group or coalition of policymakers nds benecial to
deviate from equilibrium play. In our context, central bankers are often appointed on multi-year
contracts and policy itself is commonly determined by committees whose composition changes
gradually over time as some committee members have their terms expire and new members are
appointed. At any policy meeting, therefore, there is ample opportunity for committee members
to communicate strategy and make non-binding agreements. The coalitions that we envisage
are motivated by the fact that policy is often undertaken by committees whose members have
11
tenures spanning multiple decision periods.3
There are three discretionary equilibria in the New Keynesian model with debt. Importantly,
because the economic environment is one in which there is complete and perfect information, the
existence and nature of all three equilibria is known to all agents. Moreover, the three equilibria
can be welfare ranked and agents are not indi¤erent as to which equilibrium prevails.
We treat the policy rules associated with the three equilibria as a set of policy actions,
cAb ; c
B
b ; c
C
b
	
. Because the equilibria are Nash, if policymakers in periods s = t + 1; :::;1 are
known to play fcjbg, j 2 fA;B;Cg, then the period-t policymakers best response is to also play
fcjbg. However, although it is never benecial for the period-t policymaker to unilaterally deviate
from Nash play, the period-t policymaker can potentially benet from deviations that involve
multiple consecutive policymakers. With this in mind, we consider the possibility that a nite
number of consecutive policymakers might form a coalition that deviates from playing fcjbg.
For the sake of concreteness, consider equilibria A and C. Suppose that equilibrium C is
the prevailing equilibrium and that the economy enters period t having experienced outcomes
from equilibrium C in period t   1. The policy-loss associated with staying in equilibrium C
permanently is summarised by the value function coe¢ cient, V C , determined by equation (9).
Because equilibrium A is Pareto-preferred to equilibrium C a switch to equilibrium A would be
Pareto improving. Now, suppose the period-t policymaker implements policy fcAb g, but both the
period-t policymaker and private agents anticipate that policy fcCb g will be implemented from
period t+ 1 onwards. In other words, the period-t policymaker attempts a unilateral deviation.
Private agents in period t will react according to
b;t = 
 
  cAb;t

Cb;t+1 + c
A
b;t + ;
3 In the US, Federal Reserve chairmen are appointed to a four year term, but the average tenure is somewhat
longer; governors have 14 year terms. In the UK, external monetary policy committee members have once-
renewable three-year contracts that overlap to prevent members from retiring simultaneously; internal committee
members have terms that last between 5  8 years. With most external member serving two terms, the UK MPC
completely renews after about ten years.
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and the level of debt in period t+ 1 will be given by
bt+1 =
 
  cAb;t

bt:
Now, the intertemporal loss function in period t associated with the period-t policy switch
from fcCb g to fcAb g is fully determined by the value function, Vt, and the initial condition, bt,
LCAt = Vtb
2
t ;
where
Vt = (b;t)
2 + 
 
cAb;t
2
+ V Ct+1
 
  cAb;t
2
:
For a one-player coalitionthe loss associated with a (one-period) policy switch from C to
A, which we denote LCAt (1), is necessarily greater than the loss of staying in equilibrium C,
LCt , (because a unilateral deviation from equilibrium play is not optimal in a Nash equilibrium).
But a coalition of two consecutive policymakers might nd it benecial if both deviate. We can
compute the period-t loss associated with a 2-player coalition switching from equilibrium C to A
using the following equations
b;t+1 = 
 
  cAb;t+1

Cb;t+2 + c
A
b;t+1 + ;
b;t = 
 
  cAb;t

b;t+1 + c
A
b;t + ;
bt+2 =
 
  cAb;t+1

bt+1;
bt+1 =
 
  cAb;t

bt;
Vt+1 = (b;t+1)
2 + 
 
cAb;t+1
2
+ V Ct+2
 
  cAb;t+1
2
;
Vt = (b;t)
2 + 
 
cAb;t
2
+ Vt+1
 
  cAb;t
2
:
If Vt is less than V Ct (implying L
CA
t (2) < L
C
t ), then a switch from equilibrium C to equilibrium
A could be achieved by a coalition containing the policymakers in periods t and t+ 1.
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Continuing in this way, we can compute the period-t loss associated with any coalition size,
k. If LCAt (k) becomes less than L
C
t as k increases, then the period-t policymaker will nd it
benecial to switch to fcAb g. For this simple model we obtain an analytical formula for the loss
LCAt (k)
LCAt (k) = 
kLCt +

1  k

LAt +
"
1  k

k

 
Cb   Ab
2
1   +

1  k

k
2Ab
 
Cb   Ab

1  
#
b20;
where  = 
 
bAb
2
<  < 1 and  = bAb < b
A
b =  < 1. Of course, L
CA
t (0) = L
C
t . The loss is
monotonically decreasing to LAt as k tends to innity, limk!1 LCAt (k) = LAt .4 This asymptotic
monotonicity implies that if a coalition of size k exists, and the size of this coalition is su¢ ciently
big such that LCAt (k + 1) < L
CA
t (k), then a coalition of size greater than k must also exist. In
this respect if a coalition of size k can be convinced to switch from fcCb g to fcAb g then so too
should a coalition of size greater than k and that fcAb g will be the prevailing policy with the
equilibrium given by fcAb ; Ab ; V Ag.
Reintroducing the markup shock to our baseline model,5 Figure 2 plots LCAt (k) and L
C
t as a
function of the coalition size, k.
4The rst two terms are a linear combination of LCt and L
A
t , which decreases monotonically to L
A
t as the
coalition size, k, increases. The terms in the square brackets rst increase but then decrease monotonically to
zero as k increases. Each of these terms has the functional form
 
1  ak bk; 0 < b < a < 1, hence the asymptotic
behavior.
5The markup shock is assumed to follow an AR(1) process with the persistence parameter set to 0:3 and the
standard deviation for the innovation set to 0:0046, so that the markup shock itself has a standard deviation of
0:005.
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Fig. 2. Coalition size needed to switch to equilibrium A
Figure 2 shows that it requires a coalition containing 29 consecutive policymakers in order for
LCAt (k) to fall below L
C
t . In other words, for this model a coalition containing 29 consecutive
policymakers would be necessary to make the rst member of the coalition better o¤ from a
switch to equilibrium A from equilibrium C. But, of course, the fact that the rst member of the
coalition is better o¤ by the switch is not su¢ cient to ensure that the coalition will form. We
now consider the following two possibilities. The rst possibility recognizes that policymakers
have tenures spanning multiple decision periods. Suppose that tenures are long enough that all
coalition members are the same policymaker and this policymaker is interested in the average
payo¤ over their tenure. To consider this possibility, we also plot in Figure 2 the coalitions
average loss as a function of the coalition size, k. Where the rst member of the coalition is
better o¤ from the switch to equilibrium A with a coalition size of 29, Figure 2 shows that the
average coalition member is better o¤ from the switch to equilibrium A when the coalition size
reaches 54.6 The implication is that a switch to equilibrium A becomes more feasible when
policymakers have longer tenures.
6The corresponding numbers for a switch to equilibrium A from equilibrium B are 2 players and 3 players,
respectively.
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The second possibility supposes that prospective coalition members and the private sector are
uncertain of the actions to be taken by the remaining policymakers. Thus, rather than assuming
that policymakers in periods t + k + 1 onward play cCb they place probabilities over the three
possible actions cCb , c
B
b , and c
A
b and correspondingly over the three continuation values L
C
t+k+1,
LBt+k+1, and L
A
t+k+1, where k is the conjectured coalition size. In this framework, the results in
Figure 2 correspond to the case where the probability assigned to
 
cCb ; L
C
t+k+1

equals 1 and the
probabilities assigned to
 
cBb ; L
B
t+k+1

and
 
cAb ; L
A
t+k+1

both equal 0. While LCAt (k) exhibits a
hump as k increases, a consequence of the private sectors updating dynamic, it is notable that
LCAt (1) is not much larger than L
C
t . Undertaking a numerical examination, we nd that even
a probability of just 0:005 assigned to equilibrium A as the continuation equilibrium is su¢ cient
to induce the period-t policymaker to switch to play equilibrium A.
Our analysis of coalition forming suggests that the Pareto-preferred equilibrium A is more
likely to prevail either when policymakers have long tenures or when a switch to equilibrium A by
some policymakers leads to (even slight) uncertainty about the resulting continuation equilibrium.
3.2 Eductive learnability
In this section we complement our analysis of coalition forming by considering learnability as
a mechanism for discerning among equilibria. Evans (1986) motivates expectational stability
as an equilibrium selection criterion in rational expectations models. A rational expectations
equilibrium is expectationally stable if, following small perturbations to the expectation formation
process, the system returns to that equilibrium under a natural revision rule. The relevant
revision rule emerges naturally from the thought process whereby agents undertake to revise
how they form expectations based on how those expectations would e¤ect the actual economy,
seeking to rationalise, or equate, a perceived law-of-motion with the actual law-of-motion.7 If this
7Although the revisions occur in meta-time, there is a close connection between expectational stability and
real-time least-squares learnability of a rational expectations equilibrium (Marcet and Sargent, 1989; Evans and
Honkapohja, 2001).
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natural revision rulereturns the system to the perturbed equilibrium, then that equilibrium is
said to be expectationally stable(Evans, 1986).
Like Evans (1986) and Evans and Guesnerie (2005), we view learning as a mechanism through
which agents might coordinate upon an equilibrium. Unlike their studies, however, the models
that we analyse are populated by both private agents and a policymaker, one or both of which
might be learning. As a consequence, we extend the learning literature by considering cases
where either the private sector or both the private sector and the policymaker are learning and we
derive two new expectational stability conditions.8 In each case, the learning that we entertain
is eductive in nature with agents revising their behavior in meta-time based on the outcomes
of thought experiments.9 The notion of stability under learning that we consider is iterative
expectational stability (IE-stability).10 Finally, we establish an important connection between
self-enforceability and IE-stability under private sector learning.
3.2.1 Eductive joint learning
We begin with the case where both the private sector and the central bank are learning, the case
we call joint learning. Recall that a discretionary equilibrium is fully characterised by the set
fb; cb; V g. We assume that all agents form expectations about the discretionary equilibrium
and that the perceived rules held by the private sector and policymaker must be supported by
the economys actual evolution in order to be consistent with a discretionary equilibrium. We
further assume that all agents know the beliefs (perceived reactions) of the other agents in the
model. In other words, the private sector and the central bank both know that the other is
learning, and they know the others perceived decision rules.
8We have also analysed the case where only the policymaker is learning. It turns out that this case is uninter-
esting as all equilibria are always IE-stable under policymaker learning.
9Although we focus on eductive learning, we recognise that in an adaptive learning environment realtime learning
of E-stable equilibria need not happen quickly. We leave to future work an application of real-time learnability in
models that have multiple discretionary equilibria.
10See Evans (2001) for a very useful discussion of adaptive versus eductive learning and of expectational stability
(E-stability) versus iterative expectational stability (IE-stability).
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Suppose that private agents and the central bank employ the following perceived decision
rules
t = bbt; (11)
ct = cbbt; (12)
respectively. These perceived decision rules will be consistent with a discretionary equilibrium if
they are supported by the economys actual evolution over time. Using equation (11), equations
(1) (2) imply
Ett+1 = b (bt   ct) ;
= t   ct   bt;
so that
t = (b + ) + (  b) ct: (13)
Given the perceived decision rules for the private sector and the central bank, in order to be
a best response the central banks actual decision rule must solve
V b2t = minct
n
[(b + ) bt + (  b) ct]2 + c2t +  V (bt   cbbt)2
o
;
where V is the perceived future loss. The central banks revised decision rule
ct = cbbt; (14)
with coe¢ cient
cb =  (  b) (b + )  
V
2 V + (  b)2 + 
= cb
 
V ; 

; (15)
implements the best policy response. Similarly, and the private sectors decision rule is revised
according to
t = bbt;
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where
b = b +  + (  b) cb
 
V ; 

= b
 
V ; 

; (16)
Finally, the value function is revised according to
V = b
 
V ; 
2
+  V

  cb
 
V ; 
2
+ cb
 
V ; 
2
: (17)
Equations (15) (17) dene a T-mapping, x = T (x), where x = fb; cb; V g. A xed point,
x, of the T-map, x = T (x) is said to be locally IE-stable under joint learning if
lim
k!1
Tk (x) = x;
for all x in a neighborhood of x, x 6= x. It follows that x is locally IE-stable under joint-learning
if and only if it is a locally stable xed-point of the di¤erence equation
xk+1 = T

xk

:
To establish local stability we compute the eigenvalues of the derivative T-map and determine
whether they have modulus less than one. Substituting equation (15) into equations (17) and
(16) to create a two-equation T-map, the two eigenvalues of the derivative T-map can be written
as
z1;2 =
2 + & 
r 
2 + &
2   42 h+ 2V + (  b)2i
2
 
2 + &
 ;
where
 = + 2+    2b   b;
& =



(  b) (+ 2 + b) + + V 2

+ 2V 2 (  b) (+ )
	
:
A numerical examination of these eigenvalues, evaluated at equilibria A, B, and C, establishes
that only equilibria A and C are jointly learnable.
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3.2.2 Eductive private-sector learning
Simplifying, we now consider the case where only private agents are learning. We want to
examine whether private agents can learn the reaction function fbg, given the policy rule and
payo¤s described by fcb; V g. Suppose that private agents know that the policymaker implements
the policy ct = cbbt, with known coe¢ cient cb. Also suppose that the private sector employs the
perceived decision rule (11). Equations (1) (2) imply
Ett+1 = b (  cb) bt;
= bbt   cbbt   bt;
and equating coe¢ cients yields
b = b (  cb) + cb + : (18)
Equation (18) denes the T-mapping from the perceived decision rule, fbg, to the actual
decision rule, fbg, and can be summarised in the form b = T (b). A xed point of this T-
mapping results in a perceived decision rule that is consistent with the economys actual decision
rule in a discretionary equilibrium.
Now, a xed point, b = fbg of the T-map, b = T (b) is locally IE-stable if and only if it
is a stable x-point of the di¤erence equation
k+1b = T

kb

: (19)
In this model, all three discretionary equilibria turn out to be locally IE-stable under private
sector learning. To see this, we linearise equation (19) around b to yield
k+1b =  (  cb)kb :
Applying standard results for linear di¤erence equations, b is locally stable if and only if all of
the eigenvalues of the derivative map DT (b) =  (  cb) have modulus less than one. To see
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that  (  cb) < 1 must hold for all three equilibria, note that if a discretionary equilibrium
exists, then the rate at which debt increases over time,   cb, cannot exceed  1=2. Therefore,
the existence of a discretionary equilibrium implies  (  cb) < 1.
3.3 A connection between private-sector learnability and coalition forming
We note that the IE-stability properties associated with private sector learning and joint learning,
although connected, are distinct. Joint learnability of an equilibrium neither implies nor is
implied by private sector learnability of that equilibrium. However, IE-stability under private-
sector learning and coalition forming are related. Using the general linear-quadratic rational
expectations framework we prove in an online Appendix that accompanies this paper that a
nite coalition can exist to bring about a switch to the Pareto preferred equilibrium if and only if
the Pareto-preferred equilibrium is locally IE-stable under private sector learning. The intuition
for this result is that in order to generate a successful switch to the Pareto-preferred equilibrium
the coalition of policymakers has to induce and sustain a switch in private sector expectations.
4 Conclusion
Discretionary policymakers can manage neither the expectations of private agents nor the ac-
tions of future policymakers. As a consequence, discretionary policymakers are susceptible to
expectations traps and coordination failures and discretionary control problems can have multiple
equilibria. Recognising this potential for multiple equilibria, this paper explores the important
issue of equilibrium coordination. Using a simple New Keynesian model in which government
debt is an endogenous state variable and that is known to possess multiple discretionary equi-
libria, we motivate and develop a range of equilibrium coordination/selection mechanisms. The
central coordination mechanism that we focus on is coalition forming, the idea that a meaningful
Nash equilibrium ought to be robust to the formation of coalitions in environments in which deci-
sionmakers can costlessly communicate strategy and enter into non-binding agreements. Our two
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main results relating to coalition forming are that coordination upon the Pareto-preferred equi-
librium becomes more feasible as the policymakers tenure lengthens and as the probability that
the Pareto-preferred equilibrium will be the continuation equilibrium increases. Our treatment
of coalition forming is complemented and enhanced by our analysis of learnability, an equilib-
rium coordination mechanism employed increasingly in the rational expectations literature. We
extend existing work on learnability by developing conditions for IE-stability in models in which
multiple agents are learning. We show that the Pareto preferred equilibrium needs to be joint-
learnable in order for a switch to the Pareto-preferred equilibrium driven by coalition forming to
occur. Our experience across a range of models is that the Pareto-preferred equilibrium is jointly
learnable, but that it is not necessarily private-sector learnable. It is entirely possible, therefore,
that in other models these coordination mechanisms could point toward an equilibrium that is
Pareto-dominated.
Finally, while we have focused on coalition forming and learnability in this paper, there are, of
course, other vehicles for selecting among equilibria. One such approach might be to determine
an equilibrium of interest using minimax-loss or minimax-regret, another might be to identify an
equilibrium from the limiting behavior of quasi-commitment policies. We leave the study and
application of these criteria, and an investigation into whether multiple discretionary equilibria
is a general feature of New Keynesian monetary policy models, to future work.
A Coordination mechanisms in LQ RE Models
A.1 The discretionary control problem
In this appendix, we outline the control problem facing a discretionary policymaker in the general
linear-quadratic rational expectations framework.
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A.1.1 Constraints and objectives
The economic environment is one in which n1 predetermined variables, xt, and n2 nonpredeter-
mined variables, yt, t = 0; 1; :::;1, evolve over time according to
xt+1 = A11xt + A12yt + B1ut + vxt+1; (20)
Etyt+1 = A21xt + A22yt + B2ut; (21)
where ut is a p  1 vector of control variables, vxt  i:i:d: [0;] is an s  1 (1  s  n1) vector
of white-noise innovations, and Et is the mathematical expectations operator conditional upon
period t information. Equations (20) and (21) capture aggregate constraints and technologies
and the behavior (aggregate rst-order conditions) of private agents. For their part, private
agents are comprised of households and rms who are ex ante identical, respectively, innitely
lived, and atomistic. The matrices A11, A12, A21, A22, B1, and B2 are conformable with xt,
yt, and ut as necessary and contain the parameters that govern preferences and technologies.
Importantly, the matrix A22 is assumed to have full rank.
In addition to private agents, the economy is populated by a large player, a policymaker. For
each period t, the period-t policymakers objectives are described by the loss function
Lt = Et
1X
k=t
(k t)
h
z
0
kWzk + 2z
0
kUuk + u
0
kQuk
i
; (22)
where  2 (0; 1) is the discount factor and zk =

x
0
k y
0
k
0
. We assume that the weighting
matrices W and Q are symmetric and, to ensure that the loss function is convex, that the matrix
W U
U
0
Q

is positive semi-denite.11 We assume that the policymaker is a Stackelberg leader
and that private agents are followers; we further assume that the policymaker does not have
11 It is standard to assume that the weighting matrices, W and Q, are symmetric positive semi-denite and
symmetric positive denite, respectively (see Anderson, Hansen, McGrattan, and Sargent (1996), for example).
However, since many economic applications involve a loss function that places no penalty on the control variables,
we note that the requirement of Q being positive denite can be weakened to Q being positive semi-denite if
additional assumptions about other system matrices are met (Clements and Wimmer, 2003).
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access to a commitment technology and that policy is conducted under discretion.12 With policy
conducted under discretion, the policymaker sets its control variables, ut, each period to minimise
equation (22), taking the state, xt, and the decision rules of all future agents as given. Since the
policymaker is a Stackelberg leader, the period-t policy decision is formulated taking equation
(21) as well as equation (20) into account.
A.1.2 Characterising equilibrium
For the decision problem summarised by equations (20) (22), any linear Markov-perfect equi-
librium will have the form
ut = Fxt; (23)
yt = Hxt; (24)
with the law-of-motion for the predetermined variables given by
xt+1 = Mxt + vxt+1;
where the spectral radius of M is less than  
1
2 . Further, since the loss function is quadratic and
the constraints are linear, the payo¤ to the policymaker is given by the quadratic state-contingent
value function
V (xt) = x
0
tVxt + d;
where V is symmetric positive semi-denite.
As is well-known from Backus and Dri¢ ll (1985), Currie and Levine (1985b), and Söderlind
(1999), among others, Markov-perfect equilibria can be computed by nding the x-point of the
12Events within a period occur as follows. After observing the state, xt, decisions are made rst by the incumbent
policymaker and subsequently by private agents. At the end of the period the shocks vxt+1 are realized.
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system
F =  
bQ +  bB0VbB 1 bU0 +  bB0V bA ; (25)
0 = HA12H A22H + H (A11 + B1F) A21  B2F; (26)
V = cW + 2bUF + F0 bQF+ bA + bBF0 V bA + bBF ; (27)
d = tr (V) + d; (28)
where
J = (A22  HA12) 1 (HA11  A21) ; (29)
K = (A22  HA12) 1 (HB1  B2) ; (30)
cW = W11 + W12J + J0W21 + J0W22J; (31)
bU = W12K + J0W22K + U1 + J0U2; (32)
bQ = Q + K0W22K + 2K0U2; (33)
bA = A11 + A12J; (34)
bB = B1 + A12K: (35)
University of Glasgow
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